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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the difficulties inherent in the prudent management of growth of 
microfinance organizations and on potential limits to the increased efficiency, profitability, and 
sustainability expected from growth and large size. The paper addresses both positive and negative 
implications of rapid growth for micro finance organizations. The experience ofBancoSol in Bolivia 
is used to illustrate these questions. Building upon the successful experience of PRODEM, 
BancoSol was chartered as a private commercial bank in 1992. The paper discusses the intangible 
assets inherited from PRODEM that gave BancoSol a head start and the additional advantages that 
resulted from formalization as a bank, in particular from the authorization to mobilize deposits. 
BancoSol shows outstanding success in terms of breadth, depth, and quality of outreach and in terms 
of sustainability. It is the microfinance organization with the largest number of clients in Latin 
America and it reaches poor clients who could never expect to gain access to conventional financial 
institutions. The paper discusses the incentive structure associated with a lending technology that 
has resulted in low loan arrears and the cost-effective supply of small loans. Success is explained 
by a strong concern with financial viability, development of a lending technology appropriate for 
the market niche, a long learning period, and upgrading into a formal intermediary. As it grew, 
Banco Sol had to face a reduction of revenues as a proportion of productive assets and an increase 
in the average cost of funds, which combined reduced its operating margin by 13 percentage points. 
This challenge was fully met by reducing operating expenses as a proportion of productive assets. 
While growth ofPRODEM had been mostly constrained by too rigid access to donor funds, growth 
of Banco Sol has been constrained by threats on asset quality and by diminishing marginal economies 
of size. Portfolio efficiency has grown steadily. This growth has been the net outcome, however, 
of reductions in transactions efficiency after transformation into BancoSol and of increases in 
average loan size. The paper explores the sources of increases in loan size and concludes that 
mission drift has not occurred at BancoSol. The evolution in transactions efficiency is related, in 
tum, to sources of extensive (installed capacity) and intensive (productivity) growth. Extensive 
growth has been rapid at BancoSol and it tends to dampen productivity increases. Finally, the paper 
reviews the pressures from growth on the original informal culture of the organization and the 
gradual establishment of more formal structures. 
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The Challenge of Growth for Microfinance Organizations1 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Mark Schreiner, Richard L. Meyer, 
Jorge Rodriguez, and Sergio Navajas2 
I. Introduction: The Challenge of Growth 
This paper focuses on the difficulties inherent in the prudent management of growth of 
microfinance organizations and on potential limits to the increased efficiency, profitability, and 
sustainability that may typically be expected from growth and large size.3 
The experience of Banco Solidario S.A. (BancoSol) in Bolivia is used to illustrate these 
questions. In the case of BancoSol, formalization as a bank brought with it the possibility of more 
rapid growth and thereby a number of challenges, unanticipated problems, new sources of cost, and 
second-generation adjustments. Because few Latin American microfinance organizations have 
grown so large so fast, important lessons can be learned from this case. The goals of the paper are 
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to analyze how growth has occurred in the case ofBancoSol, to assess the challenges that growth 
presents to any rr.icrofinance organization, and to identify conditions that must be met for the pru-
dent management of growth. Given the history of the creation of BancoSol, it would be impossible 
to understand the lessons from this experience if the analysis did not, when appropriate, consider the 
earlier strides during the PRODEM period. 
Growth has at least these positive implications for microfinance organizations. First, growth 
is the main mechanism for improvement of one of the key criteria for success in micro finance: out-
reach (Yaron, 1994). Increasing numbers of clients improve the organization's breadth of outreach. 
Given the very large numbers of poor but creditworthy firm-households in developing countries who 
are potential clients but who do not have access to financial services, microfinance organizations 
should seek opportunities for sustainable growth (Rhyne and Otero, 1994 ). 
Second, growth is an important mechanism for improvement in another criterion of success 
in micro finance: sustainability. Growth in the form of the addition of new and better products, such 
as deposit facilities, helps the intermediary satisfy more of the demands for financial services from 
existing and potential clienteles. This improves the quality of outreach, and it enhances the image 
ofthe microfinance organization. Sustainable growth is a signal both to the intermediary's potential 
borrowers (microclients) and potential lenders (banks) about the program's strength and purpose. 
This image of permanency serves both to attract loanable funds from banks for additional growth 
and to increase the borrowers' willingness to repay loans (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
Third, growth of assets can help reduce average operating costs. When fixed costs are 
significant and if micro finance organizations can take advantage of economies of scale, lower costs 
as a result oflarger size can help increase both outreach and sustainability. Moreover, growth in the 
form of new products may generate economies of scope that may also lower costs and improve 
profits. 
Growth is not easy, however, and it may be loaded with danger. First, expanding the 
portfolio too rapidly may increase loan arrears and losses. These losses may result from changes in 
the risk composition of the clientele as well as from more opportunities for mistakes in evaluating 
and managing risks. Rapid growth increases the share of new borrowers in the portfolio, and new 
clients are potentially riskier than older, well-established customers. Moreover, given a set of 
potential clients with heterogeneous risk profiles, expansion may require lending to riskier borrowers 
as a given market is gradually saturated. 
Second, because clients located further from the lender usually cost more to monitor, 
accelerating growth may lead to higher costs or to less oversight of borrower behavior and thus less 
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effective prevention of default. If existing control systems become overloaded, risks and costs 
increase as grovvth accelerates.4 
Third, too fast a pace of growth may also bring about difficult-to-solve inconsistencies be-
tween, on the one hand, large size and a rapid expansion of operations (which require formalization 
of structures and depersonalization of relationships) and, on the other hand, existing organizational 
structures (which are largely based on informal relationships), the skills of available human re-
sources (which may not be able to handle the new, more complex tasks of running a large 
organization), and features of the lending technology (based on personal relationships between loan 
officers and borrowers). These inconsistencies may lead to a deterioration of communications, 
costly mistakes, and an increased vulnerability to fraud. 
To address these issues properly and, at the same time, to experience healthy growth is one 
of the most difficult challenges faced by the management of self-sustainable micro finance organiza-
tions. An additional challenge is to avoid a process of loan-size creep (via larger loans to wealthier 
clients, rather than growth via larger numbers of target customers). When loan size creep happens, 
depth of outreach decreases, and the organization may drift from its original mission. 
This paper illustrates some of the main issues associated with rapid growth by reporting on 
the experience of BancoSol. The choice of this micro finance organization reflects acknowledgment 
of its outstanding overall performance. It also reflects the opportunity Banco Sol offers to identify 
gains and dangers from brisk expansion, given the intensity of the challenges of growth at this 
organization and the comparative success with which they have been addressed so far. This purpose 
is accomplished here through a brief evaluation of the history of the organization. In several ways, 
Banco Sol is an excellent laboratory for the exploration of these topics. 
What follows draws on the research project Progress in Micro finance: Lessons from Bolivia 
by the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio State University.5 The purposes of the project are to 
examine the evolution of five comparatively successful micro finance programs in Bolivia: a private 
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commercial ban.!( (BancoSol), a private, non~bank regulated financial institution (Caja de Ahorro y 
Prestamo Los Andes), and three non~govew...ment organizations (Fundacion para la Promocion y 
Desarrollo de la Microempresa -PROD EM; Centro de Fornento a Iniciativas Economicas- FIE; and 
Fundacion SARTA WI.) Given current international standards, such as those in Christen et al. 
(1995), all five microfinance organizations show strong elements of success (Gonzalez-Vega et al., 
1996). 
II. BancoSol: The Initial Conditions 
Banco Solidario S.A. is a private, fully-chartered commercial bank. After a long gestation 
based on the earlier success of PROD EM, Banco Sol began operations in early 1992. Just as any 
other bank in the country, it operates under the regulatory framework of the Central Bank and the 
prudential norms of the Superintendency ofBanks and Financial Institutions. What sets it apart from 
other Bolivian banks is a portfolio built entirely of well-performing micro loans. As such, Banco Sol 
is an outstanding example of a financially viable banking venture into microfinance. 
Although chartered as a private bank, BancoSol has strong altruistic roots. Among its share-
holders are dominant N GO and donor organizations (7 5 percent of shares) as well as prominent, suc-
cessful, and politically influential Bolivian businessmen (25 percent).6 What makes it different from 
other microfinance organizations is its charter as a regulated private bank and the explicit pursuit of 
its altruistic mission through a profit-maximizing strategy of commercial viability. BancoSol's 
shareholders expect profits and they will probably reinvest them in the quest for additional outreach, 
as they believe that a profitable operation best serves their altruistic goals. The accompanying strong 
concern for financial viability within its market niche is at the roots of BancoSol's successful 
performance. 
BancoSol's ownership structure emerged from its NGO origins in PRODEM. This micro~ 
finance organization began operations in 1987, and its rapid success made the emergence of Banco-
Sol possible. Although PRODEM now owns about one-third ofthe shares ofBancoSol, it has con-
tinued its own operations, with a new specialization in rural microfinance. 
By 1990 the belief had developed that the sustained growth of PROD EM was constrained 
by its NGO status and by its lack of access to sources of loanable funds that could be more flexible 
6 International shareholders include several NGOs and public organizations: A CCI ON Interna-
tional, Calmeadow Foundation, Societe D 'Investissement et de Developpement International, 
Rockefeller Foundation, and Inter-American Investment Corporation. Domestic shareholders 
initially included one non-government organization (PRODEM) and three private banks, 
three private firms, and five prominent individuals, including President Sanchez de Lozada. 
It was on the basis of the reputation of these prominent individuals that the prudential 
authorities were willing to issue a bank charter to BancoSol. 
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than the donors.7 Funds from the market would allow this organization to respond to substantial and 
clearly identifiable demands for credit and to manage its cash flows better in the presence of strong 
seasonal variations of such demands (Glosser, 1994). Thus, BancoSol was created as a response to 
anticipated constraints on the successful growth ofPRODEM. 
When BancoSol was established, PRODEM transferred a loan portfolio of US$ 3,960,000, 
with about 14,300 active clients, some real estate from its network of urban branches, and a PL480 
loan for US$ 850,000 at eight percent per year (Agafonoff, 1994). Additional urban branches were 
transferred later. The total value of the outstanding loan portfolio eventually transferred was US$ 
6,477,029. More importantly, PRODEM transferred to BancoSol several intangible assets that 
represent initial conditions that gave BancoSol a head start toward success.8 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
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Among the important intangible assets transferred to BancoSol were: 
a lending technology, proven and improved through the investment of several years of 
experimentation, development, and adjustment of the program's loan production function; 
a stock of information capital, accumulated over several years of working in its market niche 
and learning to understand the environment and the clientele; 
the actual client relationships embodied in a large portfolio of active, well-performing 
clients; 
the human capital embodied in an experienced staff, as a result of costly training and 
learning-by-doing processes; 
a reputation as a serious organization capable of sustaining long-term relationships with its 
clients;9 
well-established connections with international networks (particularly ACCION) and there-
sulting opportunities from technology transfers and sharing of experiences; and 
The USAID Mission, however, had made substantial funds available to PRODEM and 
wanted to see its loan portfolio grow fast. 
These intangible assets are a source of implicit subsidies for BancoSol. If properly 
accounted for, they would increase the organization's subsidy dependence (to be discussed 
below), as such consideration would raise the amount of equity and thus the level of the 
opportunity cost of the funds used by BancoSol. The implicit subsidy could have been 
eliminated had Banco Sol paid a higher price for costs of organization and other intangible 
assets at the time of founding and when additional branches were transferred. 
An image of serious concern with repayment and cost-covering pricing was critical for 
institutional survival in a country flooded with paternalistic NGOs not concerned about their 
own viability. The subsidized interest rates charged by other organizations and their lack of 
discipline in collecting loans tended to destroy the credit culture and made the job of serious 
microfinance organizations more difficult. 
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(g) a strong commitment to its mission, resulting from an unusual organizational culture 
(simmered by the leaders ofPROOEM, most of whom moved into BancoSol) as well as the 
presence of strong shareholders with a clear vision about the role of the organization. 
Formalization and upgrading to a regulated bank brought with it additional advantages: 
(a) the capacity to mobilize funds in the market with greater flexibility, through either deposits 
from the public, inter-bank loans, bonds placed in the domestic and international capital mar-
ket, or access to Central Bank rediscounts and other lines of credit; 
(b) any benefits realizable from larger size (scale and scope economies); 
(c) the intangible value of a bank charter in a financial market with severe restrictions on entry; 
and 
(d) the protection implicit in more intense, professional, and rigorous monitoring of its financial 
performance by the prudential supervisor (Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institu-
tions), new lenders (other banks and bondholders), and shareholders (who may have more 
to lose in terms of reputation after the transformation into a bank). 
Even though funds from the market typically carry higher interest rates, shorter terms to 
maturity, and shorter grace periods than do funds from donors, the overall management of 
BancoSol's liabilities has become more efficient. Access to the new sources of funds has helped to 
avoid the high transaction costs and lack of opportune disbursement sometimes suffered during the 
PRODEM days. 
Although mobilizing small deposits is expensive, BancoSol understands the social value of 
such an undertaking. The organization is in the process of adopting more efficient technologies and 
procedures to reduce these costs to reasonable levels. It seems that deposit mobilization is a wise 
investment for this microfinance organization, in terms of the preservation of the long-term 
relationships with its clientele, of the diversification of its liabilities, and of the independence that 
comes from commercial sources of funding (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
III. Breadth of Outreach 
To judge the success ofmicrofinance programs, this paper adapts the criteria of outreach and 
sustainability suggested by Yaron (1994). Outreach represents the provision of a wide array of 
financial services to large numbers of the poor. 
At least six indicators show that, by Latin American standards, the breadth of outreach of 
BancoSol is remarkable. First, the average of the monthly loan portfolios outstanding from June, 
1994 to June, 1995 was US$ 30 million (Table 1 ). 10 This outreach indicator reflected very rapid 
10 Averages of monthly portfolios over the year are used to correct for sharp seasonality. These 
and all other figures reported here are in US dollars, converted from bolivianos of constant 
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portfolio growth from the date of conversion into a bank through mid-1994, followed by some 
reduction of the portfolio in 1995, as the organization entered a period of consolidation. From the 
start of 1992 to the end of 1994, BancoSol's portfolio increased ten times in real terms. This is even 
more remarkable because the portfolio inherited from PRODEM was already large by Latin 
American standards. 
Second, the annual flow ofloans disbursed shows a similar trend, with growth accelerating 
in 1993-94 and decelerating in 1995. As an indicator of the intensity of its lending activity, Banco-
Sol disbursed US$ 84 million during 1994, five times more than PRODEM disbursed in the year 
preceding the creation of BancoSol (Table 1 ). 
Third, portfolio growth reflected a rapid expansion in the number of clients with active loans, 
from the original 14,300 transferred from PRODEM in February, 1992 to over 60,000 by late 1994. 11 
No other microfinance organization in Latin America has a larger number of active clients. 12 
Fourth, the number ofloans disbursed each year increased rapidly, reaching 143,037 during 
1994 (Table 1). 13 
Fifth, rapid growth allowed BancoSol to add continuously to its portfolio many new bor-
rowers (23,510 in 1993 and 30,021 in 1994). From the start ofPRODEM in 1987 to June, 1995, the 
accumulated number of new clients was 100,539 (Table 1). Almost two-thirds ofthese clients were 
still active in the portfolio as of June, 1995, reflecting the development of long-term relationships, 
based on the value for them of the services provided. 
11 
12 
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purchasing power as of December, 1995, at the December, 1995 exchange rate of 4.93 
bolivianos per dollar. This corrects for the impact of domestic inflation and facilitates inter-
national comparisons. 
Table 1 shows averages of the monthly number of clients with balances outstanding for the 
corresponding twelve-month period. For the period ending June, 1995, that number was 
59,745. This number of clients is larger than for the other four organizations in the Ohio 
State study combined (36,589). 
Compared to Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and Bank Rakyat Indonesia, however, BancoSol 
is small. 
Given the group-credit technology, the number ofloans granted to clients is about four times 
larger than the number of group-loans processed. At BancoSol, loans are recorded as granted 
to individuals belonging to particular groups, but some of the tasks of the loan officer relate 
to working with groups and others to working with individuals. While these distinctions 
affect the structure of costs, from the perspective of outreach what matters is the number of 
individual clients reached. 
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Sixth, BancoSol offers valuable voluntary deposit facilities to its clients. The number of 
depositors has grown rapidly. Between December, 1994 and June. 1995. the average of the number 
of outstanding passbook accounts was 29,753. These deposits come mostly from borrowers and 
have a small average balance (US$ 69). The corresponding total outstanding balance was US$ 2.1 
million. 14 Another US$ 3.2 million were generated by 1,049 time deposits, with an average balance 
of US$ 3,092, probably held by wealthier individuals or institutions, including PRODEM. The 
addition of voluntary deposit facilities to the supply ofBancoSol's microfinancial services represents 
an important improvement in its quality of outreach. 
IV. Depth of Outreach 
Depth rather than breadth of outreach connotes success in overcoming the difficulties of 
selling services to the target clientele. These difficulties are correlated with the poverty of the 
borrowers. From this perspective, the performance of Banco Sol is also remarkable, as reflected by 
the small average size of loan granted. This average size of loan is just over one-half of the Bolivian 
per capita gross domestic product. 
Moreover, portfolio growth has been associated more with increases in the numbers of bor-
rowers than in the average size of loan balance outstanding. Average balances increased from about 
US$ 150, in the PRODEM days, to about US$ 250 in the earlier days ofBancoSol, and to about US$ 
500 in recent years. Similarly, the amount disbursed per loan increased from just over US$ 300 in 
the early days of BancoSol to over US$ 600 in early 1994, but it declined to about US$ 550 by mid-
1995 (Table 1 ). This increase in average loan balance is one of the dimensions of growth that 
requires an explanation. It appears, however, that the increases have not been associated with a drift 
away from the target clientele of the poor. 
Although Banco Sol's clients are poor, they are not among the poorest of Bolivians. This fact 
may reflect, among other things, the precondition that the client must have operated an established 
business for at least one year before applying for a loan. The definition of the target market niche 
for Banco Sol -how small the loans, how poor the clients- has been the topic of constant debate 
among its owners in their evaluations concerning the organization's mission. There is no doubt, 
however, that most ofBancoSol's clients could never expect to gain access to conventional formal 
financial institutions and that the clients prefer BancoSol over traditional sources of informal credit. 
BancoSol can legitimately claim to have expanded the frontier of micro finance. 
According to survey data, about 78 percent of BancoSol borrowers are women (Table 2). 
As a result, only 42 percent of the clients consider themselves as heads of household. This reflects 
the typical composition of poor households in La Paz and El Alto. In about 80 percent of the 
14 An additional20,761 clients had compensating balances left over from earlier practices at 
PROD EM. Although these accounts are now, at least in theory, voluntary deposits, it is not 
clear that the clients have consciously decided to maintain balances in those accounts. 
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households of BancoSol clients, at least three members \vork. usually in different occupations, in 
efforts to address risks through activity diversification. A typical household arrangement may be 
for the men to work in manufacturing or seasonal construction and for the women to work in trade. 
Frequently, women market the output of their husband's industrial occupation, but they also 
diversify by marketing other products. Access to BancoSol's loans and deposits facilitates liquidity 
and risk management for the whole household. 
The concentration of women in the portfolio is associated with the concentration of loans for 
trading. Trading was the main activity of the borrowers interviewed in 63 percent of the cases, while 
BancoSol's records indicate that 83 percent of the loans in the portfolio were for trading. Thus, the 
sex distribution ofBancoSol's portfolio is not the outcome of specific targeting. Indeed, BancoSol 
does not target loans to women. Rather, this distribution reflects the predominance of Bolivian 
women in trading. In turn, the nature of the lending technology, which requires a rapid turnaround 
of borrower cash flows, leads to the concentration on loans for trade. Rapid turnaround of cash is 
needed to allow for the frequent payments required in order to facilitate the monitoring of loan 
repayment. 
The BancoSol clients surveyed operate in the informal economy of La Paz and El Alto. In 
almost two-thirds of the cases they do not keep written accounts of their revenues and expenses. This 
in part reflects low levels of education. Only 34 percent of the clients surveyed attended anything 
beyond primary school, while 33 percent either had no schooling or did not progress beyond the 
third grade. There is, furthermore, no separation between household and business in almost one-half 
of the cases (Table 2). Lack of financial statements and of other records constrains access to conven-
tional formal financial services as much as does lack of traditional collateral (Sanchez, 1996). In this 
sense, the development of a lending technology that can be implemented by a bank but which does 
not rely on standard financial information and on collateralizable assets is a formidable innovation. 
This technological progress is at the roots of the outreach achievements of BancoSol. 
For sustained implementation of this technology, it would be necessary to further revise 
Bolivia's prudential regulatory framework. Prudential regulations and supervisory norms are based 
mostly on ratios of the value of collateral to loan balances and on audited financial statements from 
the borrowers. A technological revolution in prudential practices is required to match the inno-
vations introduced by microfinance (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996a). For BancoSol, an unusual under-
standing of the nature of its operations by the Superintendent has allowed much progress, but in the 
long run this will not be sufficient without legal reforms (Trigo, 1996). 
V. Quality of Outreach 
Outreach must also be evaluated in terms of the quality of the services provided. Quality is, 
in turn, mostly reflected in the level of the transaction costs imposed on clients and in the appro-
priateness of contractual terms for the particular clientele. Borrower transaction costs were not 
measured for BancoSol's clients, so the present evaluation of the quality of services is based on 
qualitative observations. 
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Two conflicting factors influence the quality ofBancoSol's services. On the one hand, gains 
for the borrowers from low transaction costs emerge from several dimensions of the lending tech-
nology and the adaptation of Banco Sol's services to the needs of its clientele. On the other hand, 
the group-lending technology introduces transaction costs for the borrowers that do not exist in an 
individual loan. The costs for borrowers of participating in group loans result from the peer-
monitoring efforts required by the joint liability rules. These efforts attempt to avoid the obligation 
to pay another member's loan, when preventable difficulties are anticipated. Costs also result from 
the required coordination of the borrowing activities of all group members. 15 These transaction costs 
and the rigidities resulting from synchronous group transactions reduce the quality of the service 
provided, but many of BancoSol's clients may have no better alternatives, given the collateral 
requirements for borrowing elsewhere. 
Simple procedures reduce transaction costs for borrowers. For the clients surveyed, on 
average it takes about eight minutes to reach a BancoSol branch. In addition, procedures have been 
designed to economize on the client's time. One-third of the clients indicated that an important 
reason that attracted them to BancoSol was less red tape. Furthermore, the absence of real collateral 
requirements is a highly appreciated attribute for one-third of these clients. As a result of these 
features, 91 percent of BancoSol's borrowers surveyed are satisfied with its services (Table 2). 
There is, of course, additional room for improvement in the quality of these services, and BancoSol 
has been searching for ways to offer better financial products, including individual loans, to its most 
advanced clientele. 
VI. Loan Products 
BancoSol offers its clients a number of loan products as well as three deposit products. 
Loans are denominated either in bolivianos or in US dollars. Loans in bolivianos are offered for 
shorter terms to maturity and generally require more frequent payments than loans in dollars. All 
loans are amortized in equal-size installments, charge interest on the outstanding balance only, and 
do not require compensating balances. Each of these attributes adds to the value of the contracts. 
For heuristic purposes, three types ofloans in bolivianos are identified, according to payments every 
week, every two weeks, or every four weeks. Two types of loans in US dollars are identified, 
according to payments every two or every four weeks. 
Loans in bolivianos with weekly repayments are typically for first-time borrowers, and offer 
four months as average terms to maturity. These loans are granted for small amounts, with a median 
loan size ofUS$ 62 and an average size ofUS$ 82 (Table 3). The weekly repayment averages US$ 
5, and the average balance outstanding is US$ 34. The nominal interest rate charged is 4 percent per 
month, plus a flat up-front fee of2.5 percent of the loan amount. For the median loan these terms 
imply effective interest rates of about 6.1 percent per month in nominal and 4.9 percent per month 
in real terms. 
15 This paper cannot resolve the debate about group versus individual lending technologies. 
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As clients make progress in their relationship with the bank, frequency of amortization may 
shift to every two weeks or even every four weeks, depending on the occupation and cash flow of 
the client. For loans with payments every four weeks, terms to maturity may increase to an average 
of six months and up to one year, average loan size grows to about US$ 103, and the effective 
interest rate declines to about 5.2 percent per month in nominal terms and 4.0 percent per month in 
real terms (Table 3). These levels of the real effective interest rates are still quite high, highlighting 
the importance of further reducing BancoSol's operating costs, as Schmidt and Zeitinger (1994, 
1996) have argued for microfinance organizations in general. 
Good repayment allows some clients to obtain larger loans, typically denominated in US dol-
lars.16 Average loan size grows to about US$ 1,000-1,300 and median size increases to US$ 600-
825. Terms to maturity can increase to a maximum of three years and the effective interest rate can 
decline to 3 percent per month in nominal terms and 2.5 percent per month in real terms (Table 3). 
The average size of loans at BancoSol masks a size distribution made up of a large number 
(about three-quarters of the total) of very small loans and a smaller number of somewhat larger 
loans. These diverse products generate different streams of revenues and account for different shares 
of operating costs. It is likely that the larger loans are more profitable and that, in this sense, they 
cross-subsidize the cost of making smaller loans. Very small loans are expensive for both the 
organization and the client, but they may be a necessary investment for both to create the intangible 
asset of a long-term relationship. They lead to larger future loans and the totality of the relationship 
seems profitable for the bank. From the clients' perspective, moreover, continued relationships are 
strong evidence that such access is an improvement over their alternatives, despite the high costs of 
borrowing from BancoSol. 
VII. Sustainability 
A viable microfinance organization generates enough revenue over time to cover the costs 
of all factors of production and funds under its command, while being able at all points in time to 
honor the contractual obligations implied by its liabilities. This requires the ability to maintain the 
real value of equity. Organizations that can accomplish this without subsidies for their operational 
expenses, their liabilities, or their equity are commercially profitable and, therefore, are potentially 
self-sustainable. Sustainability is important inasmuch as future and not only present outreach 
matters. Because it underpins perceptions of permanency of the microfinance organization, 
sustainability generates compatible incentives for all those with an interest in its survival, such as 
clients, managers, and staff (Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). 
16 This is a stylized version of actual practice, which does not follow a rigid standard sequence. 
In general, however, it appears that the terms and conditions of loan contracts improve as the 
organization-client relationship ages. While Banco Sol operates on this principle of making 
loans with more attractive terms to clients with more experience, there are no explicit 
guidelines about the implementation of this policy. 
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Self-sustainability is frequently measured by some variation ofYaron's subsidy dependence 
index. 17 Under conventional definitions and assumptions, it can be claimed that BancoSol has been 
independent from subsidy since 1994. 18 Even before BancoSol was created, PRODEM had already 
made significant progress toward self-sustainability, as its subsidy dependence index declined from 
115 percent in 1988 to 18 percent in 1991 (Table 4 ). 19 That is, while in 1988 it would have been 
necessary to more than double the yield on the loan portfolio in order to compensate for the subsidies 
received by PROD EM, just before the transfer of the portfolio to Banco Sol in 1991 yields would 
have had to increase by only 18 percent. 20 
It is important to note that PRODEM decreased its subsidy dependence not by increasing 
loan interest rates but by reducing operating costs. Likewise, BancoSol decreased average costs 
through formalization and growth, without increasing the interest rates charged on loans. BancoSol 
also reduced subsidies by not seeking soft loans nor operational grantsY Most subsidy received by 
BancoSol comes from not earning enough to compensate for the opportunity cost of its equity. This 
subsidy poses little threat to its viability. The subsidy dependence ofPRODEM, in contrast, sharply 
increased after the creation of Banco SoL 
To compensate for all subsidies in 1995 BancoSol needed to generate a real annual yield on 
its loan portfolio of 27 percent. Given inflation in Bolivia, the required nominal yield was 41 
percent and BancoSol \vas able to produce it (Table 4). The interest rates on loans required to 
generate this yield may still be high, compared to the marginal rates of return of some microenter-
prise projects that are attractive in comparison to other investments in Bolivia. Thus, additional 
outreach is desirable and it will become possible if operating costs fall further. The impact of growth 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Yaron's index is defined as the percentage change in the yield on the loan portfolio needed 
to compensate for existing subsidies. 
Under more realistically stringent assumptions, BancoSol may still show a subsidy of US$ 
1.19 per loan outstanding per year (Table 4). By international standards for microfinance 
organizations, these subsidies are very small. 
This ignores a subsidy dependency index of 898 percent in the initial year. 
This does not mean 18 additional percentage points but rather an eighteen-percent increase 
of the existing yield level. Thus, if the yield was 46 percent per year in 1991, it should have 
been 54 percent (0.46 x 1.18). 
Computation of the subsidy dependence index for PROD EM did not include the value of 
technical assistance funded mostly by USAID and provided largely through A CCI ON Inter-
national. In the case ofBancoSol, this computation did not include the implicit subsidies that 
may have resulted from the transfer of assets from PROD EM. In addition, a guarantee agree-
ment between BancoSol and USAID enabled the bank to issue bonds. USAID agreed to pay 
bondholders 50 percent of the loss of principal in case of default, up to US$ 2.5 million. 
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as a mechanism to reduce average costs and the potential limits to this profitability-enhancing role 
of grow1h are the main topics of this paper. 
VIII. Revenues, Costs, and Returns on Assets 
During the process of growi:h BancoSol had to face two challenges. First, nominal revenues 
as a proportion of average productive assets declined from 40 percent at the time of conversion into 
BancoSol to about 33 percent in the last 18 months (Table 5). This reduction in the average yield 
on productive assets is not surprising. It resulted in part from a portfolio made up increasingly of 
larger loans, enabled by the good repayment history of experienced clients. These loans, however, 
generate lower etiective interest rates than the smaller loans typical of new borrowers (Table 3). 
Furthermore, BancoSol has not received grants to cover operating expenses, unlike PRODEM. 
Lower average revenues also reflected an increasing share of non-loan assets, such as cash andre-
serves, which earn lower rates of return than loans. These non-loan assets may be necessary evils 
of formalization, which entails meeting legal reserve requirements, and of larger organizational size, 
which increases the costs of funds in transit. After hiring experienced bankers, Banco Sol signifi-
cantly improved its non-loan asset management. 
BancoSol had to face a second chaUenge as it switched from donor funding to market-based 
li::1bilities. This switch increased the annual average cost of funds from 4 percent at the time of 
conversion to the present 12 percent in nominal terms (Table 5). At the end of 1991, about 15 
percent of PROD EM's liabilities were deposits, 19 percent were loans from private entities, and the 
remaining 68 percent were loans from public entities. By the end of 1994, loans from public entities 
were only 2 percent of total liabilities and equity, deposits were 66 percent, and loans from private 
entities were 16 percent (Gonzalez-Vega eta!., 1996). 
Declining average revenues and increasing average costs of funds reduced Banco Sol's 
operating margin by about 13 percentage points. This challenge was met successfully by reducing 
operating expenses as a proportion of productive assets from 31 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 
1994. As part of this process, the share of operating expenses in total expenses declined from 84 
percent at the end of 1992 to 59 percent at the end of 1994. This rapid and substantial reduction in 
average operating costs enabled BancoSol to reinforce its financial sustainability. As a result, 
retained earnings continued to represent about 2 percent of average productive assets throughout the 
whole period (Table 5). 
In summary, the development of client relationships with the aging of the portfolio, the 
formalization of operations, and the switch to unsubsidized funds reduced BancoSol' s intermediation 
margin, but the challenge was met through an even more dramatic reduction in average operating 
costs.22 This reduction in operating costs resulted, in tum, from economies of scale engendered by 
22 The share of personnel costs in operating expenses remained fairly constant, at about 60 
percent, while the share of general administration expenses declined from 31 percent at the 
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growth of total operations, increases in average loan size, and some increases in average terms to 
maturity. This allowed the bank to sustain the rate of return on its assets. 
Transformation into a formal financial intermediary led to increased funding from the market, 
via deposits and debt instruments. As a consequence of its bank charter and of its evident success, 
BancoSol was able to increase the ratio of its liabilities to equity from 1.0 at the end of 1992 to 6.2 
at the end of 1994. With a constant rate of return on assets, the rate of return on equity increased 
sharply, from 4.1 percent in 1992 to 13.8 percent in 1994, reflecting this higher leverage (Gonzalez-
Vega eta/., 1996). 
Another outstanding dimension of the sustainability of Banco Sol are the comparatively low 
loan arrears and losses. The proportion of the portfolio represented by loans with at least one day 
of arrears was 4.5 percent at the end of 1994. Only 1.3 percent of the portfolio showed arrears of 
more than 60 days. Provisions for bad loans represented 3 percent of the portfolio (Gonzalez-Vega 
et al., 1996). These low levels of delinquency are not typical of microfinance organizations, and 
they reflect both the commitment of BancoSol to the sustainability of its program and the strong 
incentives for repayment that emerge from its lending technology. 
IX. Incentive Structure of the Lending Technology 
Given features of the clientele (poor households undertaking highly risky, unstable and in-
formal businesses) and the nature of their loan transactions (small, short-term, non-collateralized), 
most financial intermediaries find the costs and risks of lending to clients such as those serviced by 
Banco Sol to be prohibitively high (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b ). For many micro finance organizations, 
losses from lack of repayment and operating costs preclude self-sustainability. In some organiza-
tions, inadequate technologies lead to high levels of default, while in others keeping arrears at 
reasonable levels increases operating costs too much. BancoSol has been able to strike a balance 
between costs and risks at a level that allows self-sufficiency mostly by refining a lending tech-
nology appropriate for its market niche. 
The strength of Banco Sol's lending technology is reflected in a potent set of incentives to 
repay that can be implemented at comparatively low costs to the organization.23 These low costs 
reflect, rather than intensive screening and monitoring, emphasis on contract design and contract 
23 
end of 1991 to 22 percent at the end of 1994, suggesting possible economies of scale in 
administration. 
This section describes features of the technology that may contribute to BancoSol's success. 
It does not address dynamic questions about the appropriateness of the technology for an 
evolving clientele, nor does it compare it to alternative technologies. 
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enforcement.24 First, the frequent emphasis by BancoSol in communications with its clientele, 
corroborated by common experience among the clients, that borrowers obtain access not just to a 
single loan but rather to a long-term relationship with a reliable and permanent lender, is a strong 
incentive. The value of this relationship is high, given its expected duration, the existing borrowing 
alternatives for a typical client, and the features of loan contracts described below. 
Second, these incentives include the sequential and substantial improvement in the terms and 
conditions of loan contracts for well-performing clients. In effect, borrowers with impeccable 
repayment records not only have access to increasingly larger loans, but also to longer terms to 
maturity and less frequent repayments. 25 These changes in tum imply a significant reduction in 
effective interest rates and in borrower transaction costs. This contract design introduces potent 
incentives, as the quality of the credit service substantially improves with the aging of the client-
organization relationship. Even a few days of arrears, moreover, are sufficient to delay progress of 
a given client along this sequence. This is a strong incentive for punctuality. 
Third, BancoSol can monitor borrowers cheaply on the basis of frequent repayments, mostly 
through the immediate verification of arrears for the group. Loan officers do not make costly, 
deliberate visits to the borrower unless a problem has been detected. Instead, these trips are triggered 
o:.,, missed repayments, about which the loan officer is informed within one day. Moreover, given 
that BancoSol will not accept any payment from a group or any individual in the group unless the 
payment is enough to cover the entire amount owed by the whole group, group members are enlisted 
to monitor each other. To f1cilitate this delegated peer monitoring they arc required to work close 
to each other. 
Fourth, timely disbursements increase the value of the client-organization relationship by 
reducing borrower transaction costs. Applications from new borrowers are processed within a few 
days; there is no interruption of service for repeat borrowers because applications for additional loans 
are received and processed before the earlier loan becomes due. Simple procedures, adapted to the 
clientele, also lower transaction costs. 
Fifth, demanding no more loan security than joint liability among group members represents 
an additional determinant of the high value of the relationship with BancoSol, at least for those 
clients who would not be able to offer the collateral required by other lenders. It is this feature of 
24 
25 
The general principles represented by these incentives are incorporated in other successful 
microlending technologies, even when they use a different mix of activities to evaluate 
creditworthiness and to enforce loan contracts. 
As the clients progress, they may begin to demand a quality of services that may not be 
possible within the group-lending technology. This represents one of the most difficult 
challenges faced by BancoSol. 
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the technology that makes it possible for BancoSo! to expand the frontier of microfinance by 
reaching a clientele that may not have better options. 
Joint liability per se, however, does not guarantee repayment, as the incentives that it creates 
have ambiguous impacts on the group members' willingness to repay (Besley and Coate, 1995; Cha-
ves, 1996). This results from two opposing externalities. In one case, non-defaulting members 
undertake repayment for defaulting members or harass delinquents to avoid the loss of their own 
relationship with BancoSol. In the other case, default by some members prompts default by others 
if the cost of repayment of the defaulter's loan are higher than the value of the relationship. 
Repayment depends on the stability of the groups, which may be enhanced or threatened by these 
conflicting effects. Understanding the net balance between these effects in the case of BancoSol 
would require additional research. The fact is, however, that loan arrears and losses have been very 
low. 
The inevitable contract rigidities that accompany group borrowing may further reduce the 
value for the client of this relationship. These rigidities include, among others, the need for 
synchronous terms to maturity and repayment schedules, as well as the need to participate in group 
meetings. Joint liability may thus represent comparatively high costs and risks for borrowers who 
could otherwise have access to individual loans. Thus, to the burdens ofjoint liability must be added 
the inconvenience costs for the client from group credit. 26 
Sixth, the highly personalized service offered to the clients represents an additional powerful 
incentive for repayment. A long-term personal connection is developed between the loan officer and 
the borrower and powerful informal incentives to fulfill contract commitments emerge from this 
bond. A similar personal allegiance (which may already exist) is further strengthened among the 
members of a borrowing group. Moreover, BancoSol has been successful in culturally adapting its 
operations and personalizing the organization's image. 
Seventh, contract enforcement is also enhanced by the credibility of the threats of penalties 
in case of lack of fulfillment of loan obligations. This credibility emerges from: 
26 The paper does not claim that group credit is superior to individual loan transactions nor that 
group joint liability is the key determinant of BancoSol's success. There are important 
advantages to the client (and presumably to the organization) from individual transactions. 
As reported by Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1996), Caja Los ANDES and FIE have been able to 
show as good or even better repayment indicators as BancoSol, while still operating with 
individual clients. The argument here is only that, for a given subset of clients, the opportu-
nity to borrow even if they do not possess collateralizable assets enhances the value of their 
relationship with Banco Sol and thus contributes to repayment through this route, rather than 
via the peer-monitoring effect emphasized elsewhere (Stiglitz, 1990). Increased competition 
in the market challenges BancoSol to improve the quality of its contracts beyond the 
constraints of group credit in order to protect the loyalty of its most advanced clientele. 
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(a) the immediate reaction to arrears (as early as the next day), followed by both loan officer and 
group involvement in the search for a solution; 
(b) interruption in the sequence of improvements in contract terms and conditions, as a 
consequence of arrears; 
(c) denial of future loans for the whole group in case of default; and 
(d) the sharing of information on default among micro finance programs, which prevents 
delinquent borrowers from switching to other organizations. 
This discussion reveals ways in which BancoSol's lending technology has attempted to 
resolve difficult problems typically associated with micro finance (Gonzalez-Vega, 1996b ). Its 
comparative success suggests that these solutions have been achieved at reasonable costs for both 
lender and borrowers, and this helps explain remarkable outcomes in terms of outreach and 
sustainability. The discussion has also suggested unresolved issues and new challenges, including 
the prudent management of growth. 
X. Determinants and Consolidation of Success 
Several features of its organizational design and technological development have contributed 
to BancoSol's achievements. First, since BancoSol's creation its leaders have been deeply 
concerned with the organization's financial viability. This attitude was reinforced by the 
confirmation of its own success. In practice, this attitude gradually led, through a process of search 
for formalization, to self-sustainability. This concern was reflected, among other things, in the adop-
tion of interest-rate policies that sought to cover the costs of lending and in a resolute attitude toward 
loan collection. Since the very beginning, BancoSol explicitly told its clients that it expected loans 
to be repaid. 
Second, over the years the organization developed a lending technology appropriate for its 
market niche. This allowed it to provide financial services to a clientele that other intermediaries find 
difficult to reach and to do so cost-effectively for both the organization and the borrowers. The 
success of this technology has been reflected in low rates of arrears and default. 
Third, there was a fruitful investment in experimentation and learning during the PRODEM 
period. Success in the development of a micro finance program rests on the accumulation of know-
ledge and experience about the environment in which it operates, relevant features of the clientele 
it serves, the individual creditworthiness of heterogeneous clients, and the comparative advantages 
of its own technology. This success requires constant fine-tuning and adjustment of the technology 
to varied local circumstances. External assistance mostly from ACCION, funded by USAID, was 
crucial for this purpose. 
Finally, the transformation from NGO into a formal financial intermediary also contributed 
to BancoSol's success. It is safe to claim that, even ifPRODEM had remained a successful NGO, 
it not would have achieved the levels of outreach and sustainability that upgrading made possible 
for BancoSol. The accumulated tangible and intangible assets of PRODEM, moreover, gave 
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BancoSol a head start. Had this organization started from scratch, it would have taken much longer 
to reach the present levels of profitability and self-sustainability. This must be recognized in any 
discussion about replication of BancoSol 's success. 
Moreover, if learning effects are important in microfinance, it may not be advisable to be 
born large. Gradual growth from small origins may be a preferred strategy. This may allow for 
experimentation by trial and error while ensuring that mistakes are not extremely costly and that 
corrections are possible without leading to disintegration of the organization (Chaves and Gonzalez-
Vega, 1996). The organization must also acquire the tools to deal with future problems effectively. 
BancoSol's transformation into a formal financial intermediary consolidated this process of 
improvement in outreach and sustainability. Formalization as a bank made possible more flexible 
access to loanable funds. This relaxed the constraint experienced by PRODEM and encouraged a 
rapid expansion of the loan portfolio. So far this growth, critical for BancoSol's improved outreach 
performance, has been compatible with self-sustainability. 
Growth has not been easy to manage, however, and opportunities for further growth at the 
rapid rates of the recent past may encounter severe limitations. Partly in recognition of the threats 
raised by pressures on arrears and on internal control mechanisms and partly in recognition of the 
emerging tensions between the existing culture and the new organizational structure required by 
rapid growih, during 1995 BancoSol reduced its rate of expansion. Instead, it focused on improving 
its financial management, refashioning its information systems, and redesigning its organizational 
structures. 
XI. The Challenge of Growth 
The recent experience ofBancoSol highlights the costs and benefits of a process of very rapid 
growth and suggests the nature of potential internal and external limits to gains in productivity and 
profitability that usually accompany growth. 
The evolution of this organization can be divided into two stages, each one characterized by 
a dominant limit to growth. During the first stage (PRODEM period), growth was liability-
constrained. Even at the high rates of interest needed for sustainability, a substantial demand for its 
credit services had been identified and a cost-effective technology had been developed. Because of 
the NGO status of the organization, however, access to loanable funds was limited to donor finance. 
Moreover, its NGO status limited the extent to which equity could be leveraged with additional 
liabilities mobilized in financial markets (Rosenberg, 1994). Additional complications emerged 
from high seasonal variations in cash flows. Access to short-term money markets would have 
allowed a more efficient management of these cash flows. 
Constraints thus emerged from the lack of flexibility of donor funding, lack of credibility of 
the microfinance organization due to the absence of a regulatory framework to protect potential 
lenders against its insolvency or illiquidity, and limited leverage, due to the absence of a bank charter 
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to mobilize deposits from the public. The resulting inability to grow and serve the clientele as 
desired frustrated PRODEM's leadersY To a large extent these constraints were removed with the 
creation of Banco Sol and the accompanying formalization. 
The second stage (BancoSol period) is characterized by the threats of growth on asset quality 
and by the diminishing marginal economies of size and the resulting limits on opportunities to 
increase productivity as a consequence of growth. These limits are a challenge for microfinance 
organizations and are reflected in the evolution of key productivity and efficiency indicators. 
XII. The Evolution of Efficiency 
Efficiency is defined here as the amount of outputs per unit of cost. Costs are defined as 
expenses recorded in the organization's accounts along with any unrecorded expenses or implicit 
subsidies. Outputs of a microfinance organization may be the amount of the loan portfolio or the 
number of loans outstanding or the number and amount of loans disbursed. 
Productivity, in tum, is defined as the amount of outputs per unit of input. Inputs may be 
expressed in units such as branches, loan officers, or dollars of assets. The evolution of productivity 
helps understand changes in efficiency, and efficiency directly influences profitability. 
The most critical indicator of efficiency is the average portfolio outstanding per unit of cost: 
portfolio efficiency. This is measured as the monthly average portfolio outstanding divided by total 
economic costs, which include the organization's total expenditures, subsidy from not paying the 
total opportunity costs of its liabilities and equity, and other grants. Per each $100 of cost, this in-
dicator increased from 43 for 1987, during the early PRODEM days, to 140 by 1991, before the 
transformation. During the BancoSol period, this indicator increased from 167 in 1992 to 224 in 
1994 (Table 6). These efficiency measures mean that in 1987 it cost $ 2.35 to keep an average 
balance of$ 1.00 in the portfolio for a year, but that this cost had declined to$ 0.72 by 1991. In 
tum, to keep $ 1.00 in the portfolio cost$ 0.60 in 1992 and$ 0.45 in 1994. 
The sustained growth of portfolio efficiency reflected by these ratios allowed BancoSol to 
reduce its average portfolio costs sufficiently to remain profitable in the face of declining average 
revenues and of increasing costs of funds. To understand how this achievement was possible, it is 
necessary to examine the evolution of some components ofthis indicator. 
Portfolio efficiency, measured as the ratio of the outstanding portfolio with respect to costs, 
can be expressed as the product of the number ofloans per unit of cost (transactions efficiency) times 
the average size of loan balances outstanding: 
27 Limited access to funds in the early stages of the organization may not be a curse, however, 
if learning and experimentation are critical in the achievement of self-sustainability. 
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Portfolio efficiency= (transactions efficiency) x (loan size) 
LIC = (NIC) (LIN) (1) 
where L is the total portfolio outstanding, C are total costs, and N is the number of outstanding 
balances. Improvements in portfolio efficiency can then be interpreted as a result of increases in the 
number of loans outstanding per unit of cost or of increases in loan size. 
Increases in loan size dilute fixed costs over a larger balance outstanding. Transactions 
efficiency reflects improvements in physical productivity, that is, in the number of transactions 
carried out at a given level of total expenditures. Increases in transactions efficiency can be achieved 
by several means, including a lengthening of the average term to maturity of outstanding loans. This 
allows fewer procedures per outstanding balance over a period of time. 
Two periods can be identified with respect to changes in transactions efficiency. During the 
PROD EM period, the monthly average number of loans held in the portfolio per US$ 100 of 
economic cost increased from 0.34 in 1987 to 0.80 in 1991 (Table 6). During this period, the num-
ber of loans grew more rapidly (34-fold) than total costs (14-fold). This meant that the annual cost 
of holding one loan in the portfolio declined from US$ 292 in 1987 to US$ 118 in 1991. 
During the Banco Sol period, however, the number of loans per US$ 100 of cost steadily de-
clined, from 0.67 in 1992 to 0.41 in 1994 (Table 6). This represented a reduction in transactions effi-
ciency, and the cost of holding one loan in the portfolio increased from US$ 149 in 1992 to US$ 242 
in 1994. This was due to costs increasing 4.8-fold, while the number ofloans grew only 2.8-fold.28 
XIII. Increases in Loan Size 
BancoSol's portfolio efficiency improved steadily, despite reductions in transactions effi-
ciency. This result was possible because of increases in average loan balance outstanding. These 
increases began in the PRODEM period, when average balance increased from US$ 124 in 1987 to 
US$ 162 in 1991, and then persisted during the BancoSol period, when loan balances increased from 
US$ 250 in 1992 to US$ 542 in 1994 (Table 1).29 If it was this rise in average loan balance that 
allowed BancoSol to remain profitable despite reductions of transactions efficiency, it is important 
to examine the sources and consequences of growth of loan size as well as the causes of the decrease 
in transactions efficiency. 
28 
29 
The reduction in transactions efficiency was even more pronounced when measured with 
respect to numbers and amounts of loans disbursed. The cost per loan disbursed increased 
from US$ 49 in 1992 to US$ 93 in 1994 (Table 6). 
At the same time, the average amount disbursed per loan increased from US$ 156 in 1987 
to US$ 317 in 1991, and from US$ 409 in 1992 to US$ 588 in 1994 (Table 1). 
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There are at least three reasons why loan sizes increase throughout a microfinance orga-
nization's life: ... ~ 
(a) policy-induced increases, due to changes in the loan-supply criteria adopted by the organiza-
tion as a response to threats to its sustainability or redefinitions of its market niche. These 
increases may reflect the search for wealthier clients who, ceteris paribus, demand larger 
loans than poorer clients; 
(b) information-induced increases, as accumulated knowledge and experience in the market and 
revised perceptions of risk make it possible to increase the initial loan size and/ or accelerate 
the growth of loan size for additional repetitions along the sequence for a client ·with a given, 
imperfectly observed repayment capacity and level of poverty; and 
(c) client-induced increases, as individual customers grow and both improve their repayment 
capacity and demand larger loans. For the organization, the maturing of its portfolio 
increases the share of these established clients among the total number of borrowers. 
Client-induced and information-induced increases in loan size are not in conflict with out-
reach objectives, but policy-induced increases may be associated with mission drift. That is, if loan 
size increases (due to the information effect) for a client with a given repayment capacity, the wealth 
of the given client is unchanged.30 Also, if loan sizes increase because the borrowers are getting 
better off, this effect simply reflects the materialization of the desired wealth-increasing progress of 
the target clientele. Policy-induced increases in loan size may in some cases reflect departures from 
the organization's original mission and target clientele. 
Policy-induced increases are usually reflected by changes in the average amount disbursed 
to new clients in a given year. Information-induced increases result in amounts disbursed which 
increase rapidly after the first few loans, but that later on grow more slowly as loan size approaches 
repayment capacity. Client-induced increases are reflected by continued growth ofloan size after 
several loan cycles, when supply matches demand closely and demand growth causes the changes.31 
In the case of BancoSol, although there were policy-induced increases in loan size when 
constraints on the liability side were removed, most of the expansion of the portfolio appears to 
reflect client-induced and information-induced increments in loan size. This result is consistent with 
30 
31 
For example, if a client in the target group has a repayment capacity of US$ 450, but 
BancoSol starts at US$ 150 because it does not know enough about that repayment capacity, 
and then increases loan size to approach US$ 450, this does not mean that it is leaving the 
target clientele behind. Over time, as the organization learns more about the characteristics 
of its clientele, this generic information may also induce an increase in first-loan size (e.g., 
to US$ 200) for the same type of client. 
The figures are interpreted here on the basis of these non-testable assumptions, as repayment 
capacity is not known to the researchers and is only imperfectly observed by the lender. 
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sustained attention to the same market niche and does not represent a deviation from the 
organization's initial mission to assist the poor. Furthermore, increases in loan size as the client-
organization relationship evolves are critical to sustain strong incentives to repay. In this sense, 
opportunities for increasing loan size are needed for sustainability and greater outreach over time. 
The size of the first loan disbursed to a new client increased rapidly in the early days of 
BancoSol and later decreased to almost the original level. For a sample of259 borrowers surveyed, 
the average size of their first loan increased from $ 96 in 1991 to $ 170 in 1994, but then decreased 
to $ 108 in 1995 (Table 8). A similar behavior was observed for each additional (second, third) loan. 
These changes in loan size, controlling for the number of repetitions, reflected policy revisions to 
the extent to which, after the transformation into Banco Sol, the organization felt that it could make 
larger loans to its clients, once it had overcome the liquidity constraints typical of the PROD EM 
period. This attitude was revised in 1995, and loan size decreased to historical levels. 
Changes in policy were also reflected by an increase in the dispersion of loan sizes. That is, 
loans to larger customers grew even faster than the rest. Reductions in loan sizes in the most recent 
year also reflected policy revisions, as BancoSol prudently responded to the increasing pressures on 
loan arrears and losses that accompanied earlier increases of loan sizes, by becoming more cautious 
with its clients at all stages of the evolution of the organization-client relationship. 
Growth ofloan size with each repetition has been particularly rapid for the earlier repetitions. 
For the sample, on the average the second loan was 70 percent larger than the first, the third loan was 
58 percent larger than the second, and the fourth loan was 41 percent larger than the third. This 
suggests that the information effect dominates the earlier growth of loan size. The rate of growth 
ofloan size was 22 percent for the fifth loan, however, and between the fifth and the sixth loan it was 
only 5 percent. This suggests that the repayment capacity ceiling was being approached at about this 
time. Beyond this level, loan sizes increase mostly in response to demand growth due to client 
success. 
By making it possible to dilute fixed costs, larger loan sizes increase portfolio efficiency. 
At BancoSol, the average balance for individual clients increases with additional repetitions. The 
average number of members in a borrowing group tends to decline over time, however, which has 
a negative impact on efficiency. Declining group size affects efficiency because some of the 
activities of loan officers deal with groups rather than individual clients. As of September, 1995, 
almost 58 percent of the groups had four members, 27 percent had less than four, and 16 percent had 
5 to 9 members (Gonzalez-Vega eta!., 1996). 
To the extent that some ofBancoSol's larger clients are attracted by more appealing contract 
terms and conditions offered at other microfinance organizations, the bank may be losing some of 
its most profitable clients to growing competition in the market. When they are willing and able to 
offer collateral, these customers may be attracted by the opportunity to obtain individual loans at 
lower interest rates. 
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XIV. Extensive and Intensive Growth 
Portfolio growth may reflect two different processes: 
(a) extensive growth, the result of increased installed capacity, leading to a larger organization 
and more sources of fixed cost, such as headquarters, branches, or loan officers; and 
(b) intensive growth, the result of increased productivity of existing capacity, such as larger 
balances and/or numbers of loans per branch or per loan officer. Intensive growth results 
from technological innovation, from increased efficiency due to more effective incentives 
for staff performance, from learning and the accumulation of experience, from externalities 
due to having done a good job in the past, and from improved capacity utilization (economies 
of scale) either through larger numbers of loans or increased loan sizes. 
Extensive growth can have a negative impact on the organization's productivity, for at least 
four reasons. First, indivisible additions to existing installed capacity (larger headquarters, new 
branches, new employees) typically reduce the organization's average productivity until the new 
capacity is fully utilized. New units cannot start at full capacity. For example, a new branch with 
the same fixed costs as an old branch has few borrowers to dilute costs initially. 
Second, not all branches are equally productive, even after their installed capacity is fully uti-
lized. The reason is that age of branch matters for productivity. To the extent to which learning 
effects matter, older branches are, ceteris paribus, more productive. Not only does it take time for 
a branch to reach capacity utilization, but the passage of time itself increases productivity, as 
information is accumulated and lessons are learned from experience. 
Third, not all branches are born equally productive because location matters for branch 
productivity. Market potential declines as the microfinance business moves from prime locations, 
densely populated with flourishing microenterprises, toward marginal locations. The number of 
potential borrowers is less, their wealth is smaller, and the risk-adjusted returns from their enterprises 
is lower at marginal branches, even at full capacity utilization. Given fixed costs of branch 
operation, new but thinner markets reduce average productivity. 
Fourth, communication costs increase as the organization expands across space, and 
headquarters finds it more difficult to monitor decentralized branches. These costs compensate some 
of the gains from economies of scale. 
Extensive growth via recruiting additional loan officers also tends to reduce the or-
ganization's productivity because loan officers need time to develop their own clientele. 
Accumulating a complete loan portfolio requires about nine months. To the extent to which on-the-
job learning matters, more experienced loan officers are more productive than the new ones. Further, 
the average level of skills of loan officers may decline with rapid recruitment. Finally, loan officers 
assigned to marginal locations must deal with a more difficult market. 
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Because of these Ricardian consequences of increases in the number of branches and the 
number of loan officers, the organization's overall average productivity will tend to decline every 
time a new branch is created or a new loan officer is hired. Much of this reduction in productivity 
will be temporary, until full capacity utilization is achieved at the new branch, but some will be 
permanent, as a consequence of smaller market potential at the new location. The larger the organi-
zation already is, however, the smaller the negative marginal impact on average productivity of the 
new branches or loan officers will be, because the reduction will be diluted over a larger base. 
The general trend under extensive grovvth appears to be for branch productivity to decline 
over time, as smaller branches are created in marginal areas, and for loan officer productivity to 
reach a natural limit. This potential limits to growth represent a challenge that the organization must 
address by improving productivity via intensive growth. Extensive growth may make it possible, 
however, to further dilute the costs of the national headquarters and of other organization-wide 
functions, thus reducing average costs, as long as the resulting economies of scale are not offset by 
the diseconomies of communication and internal control that eventually emerge in large or-
ganizations. 
BancoSol has experienced rapid extensive growth. In the five years before the transforma-
tion, PROD EM grew from one branch to four. In the four years after the transformation, BancoSol 
grew from 4 branches to 32. There was an exceptionally rapid creation of new branches in 1993 and 
1994. Similarly, the number of employees increased from 13 to 97 during the PROD EM days and 
continued to grow at Banco Sol. reaching 302 in 1995 (Table 7). The proportion of ~he total number 
of employees who are loan officers remained fairly constant at about two-thirds. The number of loan 
officers increased from 6 to 54 (1987-1991) and from 59 to 183 (1992-1995). 
Following transformation into BancoSol, rapid expansion of the branch network brought with 
it some of the negative consequences of extensive growth on average productivity. Between 1987 
and 1991, the average value of the monthly portfolio outstanding per branch had increased from US$ 
69,150 to US$ 905,669. As shown in Table 7, growth ofthe portfolio outstanding per branch has 
been modest since the creation of BancoSol. Measured as the annual amount disbursed per branch, 
productivity increased from US$ 586,668 in 1987 to$ 4,662,133 in 1993, but it steadily declined 
afterwards, to US$ 2,797,648 per branch in the twelve-month period ending on June 30, 1995. The 
lower level of disbursement per branch was compensated by some increase in the size and terms to 
maturity of the loans disbursed.32 
These reductions in branch productivity would be a cause of concern to the extent to which 
large volumes of operations may be necessary to dilute the fixed costs of creating and operating a 
branch. How critical this is depends on the level of fixed costs of operating a branch, including 
32 The decline of transactions productivity per branch was even more pronounced. The annual 
number ofloans disbursed per branch increased from 3,758 in 1987 to 14,686 in 1991 and 
steadily declined to 4,871 in the twelve-month period ending on June 30, 1995 (Table 7). 
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security, office space, salaries, ::md equipment. Similar trends are observed with respect to 
Banco Sol's employee-and-loan-officer productivity. 33 
In summary, while growth during the PRODEM period was mostly intensive, growth during 
the BancoSol period has been mostly extensive. This allowed the organization to significantly im-
prove its outreach, but it resulted in a slow growth of portfolio productivity per branch. Because the 
cost of operating a branch has not declined, extensive growth has tended to dampen efficiency and 
profitability. Because the cost of hiring loan officers and other employees has increased, these trends 
have dampened efficiency and profitability. This is a serious problem if productivity gains peter out 
before the organization reaches self-sustainability, but BancoSol has already become self-
sustainable. Moreover, as emphasized above, reductions in productivity and efficiency do not 
necessarily represent poorer management. Instead, they may represent diminishing marginal gains 
from larger size and, therefore, the consequences of the limits to grov.1h. The challenge is to offset 
these trends with additional innovations, a task that the management of BancoSol understands. 
XV. Growth, Culture, and Structure 
Since the creation of PRODEM and then as BancoSol, the organization has cultivated an 
idiosyncratic ar.-i unusually cf£'-:ctive cu~ture. This informal culture prevailed over PRODEM's 
formal structures. InJeed, to the extent the organizational structure v.as formally defined, it was 
fairly simple and ±1at. Instead of a rigid hierarchy, there was a conscious investment in the de-
velopment of highly personalized relationship. This presumably resulted in a strong set of personal 
motivations, despite the absence of explicit pecuniary incentives, as well as in a climate receptive 
to innovation, clear commitment to the organization's mission, and a style of self-management that 
emphasized recognition of individual contributions to the team's effort. This culture was well-
adapted to the nature of the semi-formal lending technology and to the features of the clientele. 
During the PRODEM period, personal affinity and informal attachments may have con-
tributed to high staff productivity and low operating costs in ways that are only possible in a small 
organization. An ardent and charismatic leadership promoted the development of a strong 
organizational ideology and encouraged devotion to an appealing goal: outreach via commercial 
viability. The approach, based on personal trust, applied both to the relationships among the staff 
within the organization and to those between the loan officer and the client. Threats of waste and 
instability emerged from continued informality, however, when the organization grew rapidly into 
a large, regulated financial intermediary. 
33 The number of balances outstanding per loan officer increased from 87 in 1987 to 346 by 
1991. This indicator increased to 351 in 1994, but it declined to 326 for the twelve-month 
period ending on June 30, 1995 (Table 7). Despite declines in portfolio and transactions 
productivity per employee and per loan officer, however, BancoSol's levels of productivity 
are high compared to other Latin American microfinance organizations. 
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The orga..11ization has believed, moreover. in the importance of consistency bet\'lleen its perso-
nalized culture, based on trust, team work, and peer monitoring among branch employees. and its 
personalized lending technology, based on trust in the client and peer monitoring among borrowers 
in the group. Because this consistency is believed to be an essential determinant of BancoSol's 
success, there has been concern that any transformation and depersonalization of the organization's 
culture may lead to reduced efficacy of the lending technology. Because much of the success of 
Banco Sol is due, however, to the structure of incentives embedded in the lending technology and 
its commitment to self-sufficiency, as described earlier, these changes may not necessarily threaten 
the organization. 
Rapid growth has introduced tensions in this system, nevertheless, in reflection of the agency 
problems that typically emerge as organizations grow. 34 A stronger foundation and scaffolding 
became necessary to sustain the larger organization; the links between the different parts of the 
system had to be defined more formally, and the lines of command and channels of communication 
had to be strengthened. Experienced businessmen in the Board of Directors perceived this need and 
a process of adjustment has been implemented during the past year.35 The ensuing ideological 
debates within the organization have been both intense and fruitful. After transformation into 
BancoSol, PRODEM's original executive team (the visionaries) was complemented with experi-
-=:-;ced banl<ers and profc::siomls in the m:magement of human resources, assets and liabilities, 
information systems, and operations (the bankers). 
\Y:t!; growth then came the challenge of how to move from the original informal culture to 
the new and more formal structure, without reducing the quality of service to the clientele and 
destroying the unified vision that has guided the organization in its evolution. High quality of 
service protects the value of the organization-client relationship, the most important determinant of 
repayment and, therefore, of the organization's self-sustainability. The challenge has been how to 
34 
35 
Agency problems emerge when those who devote resources to a particular purpose (the prin-
cipals) surrender partial control over those resources to those in charge of implementing the 
purpose for them (the agents). Because the agents have their own objectives, the principals 
need to monitor and constrain their behavior to make sure that the original purpose is 
achieved. As the organization grows, there is a reduced ability ofBancoSol's board of direc-
tors (the principals) to monitor at low cost and to constrain effectively the behavior of central 
and regional offices and the bank's staff (the agents). Formal structures for internal control 
and formal incentives for improved staff and management performance must then be created. 
This was one instance when the presence of private bankers in the ownership of the organiza-
tion may have been important. These entrepreneurs recognized the need for more effective 
internal control mechanisms and better managerial skills to face the challenges of operating 
as a regulated commercial bank. Other owners in the board played, in turn, the role of 
guardians of the mission, making sure that adjustment did not move BancoSol away from 
the target clientele. 
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use an increasingly formal system to provide an inevitably quasi-informal service to a clientele that 
highly values personalized treatment and is bound by implicit rather than highly formalistic con-
tracts. 
The search for a solution has recognized the need to balance, on the one hand, the need to 
solidify the formal structure, for the sake of efficiency inside the organization, via effective infor-
mation flows, decision-making processes, security, and communications, and, on the other hand, the 
need to preserve the personalized culture of contact with the clientele outside the organization in 
order to sustain the incentives that result in low costs and low risks in lending. 
Moreover, the heterogeneity of the clientele makes it difficult to adopt uniform standards for 
the development of the organization-client relationship. Given this heterogeneity, it is impossible 
to anticipate all situations, and portfolio management will always require the discretionary decision-
making ofloan officers. Decentralization introduces problems both in measuring and in encouraging 
staii performance. The PRODEM-BancoSol tradition has been to encourage efficient staff 
performance via peer monitoring, a natural counterpart to the peer monitoring mechanisms used as 
part of the lending technology. The large size of the organization and the greater distance among 
decentralized units (such as branches opened in remote parts of the country) and between regional 
and central offices have multiplied. however, the dangers of poor communications and inadequate 
oversight. 
To address thes~ challenges. the divisions of the central office have been redesigned as 
service units responding on demand to the rest of the organization. The concept of self-management 
has been redefined from a culture of"do as you like" to a system of"do well what you have been 
asked to do." This has paved the way to the introduction of performance indicators and the design 
of a pecuniary incentive system based on employee and branch performance.36 Introduction of these 
incentives may be critical to encourage productivity growth on the intensive margin, through more 
efficient effort on the part of the staff. In view of the limits to growth identified above, increased 
productivity is crucial. 
In summary, rapid growth and large size have forced BancoSol to revise its original orga-
nizational design. Private owners in the board of directors, concerned with their reputation and the 
safety of their investment, have taken an active role in promoting key managerial reforms and in 
providing tighter internal control. Altruistic owners have insisted, in turn, on preserving the integrity 
of the original mission, as the only justification for the investment of public sector funds in a private 
banl<. Among the executive staff, the visionaries from the PROD EM stage have become guardians 
of the consistency between organizational design and lending technology, while the bankers brought 
36 In the design of these incentives, BancoSol has been careful in assigning appropriate weights 
to individual as well as team performance at the branch, regional, and national levels. This 
has reflected an effort to promote both local and global improvements in performance. 
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in by the board have been able to use their sophisticated professional skills in a more effective 
pursuit of the original mission. Only time will tell how successful this unique combination will be. 
XVI. Conclusions 
This paper has illustrated the comparatively successful performance of BancoSol in terms 
of outreach and sustainability, has identified likely determinants of such success, has examined the 
process of rapid growth ofthe bank's operations, and has evaluated the organization's responses to 
the challenges posed by rapid growth. This concluding section attempts to derive some general 
lessons for micro finance organizations about how best to address the challenge of reaping the gains 
from large size while avoiding the dangers from the acceleration of growth. 
Although BancoSol' s clients are poor, not all of them are among the poorest of Bolivians. 
There is no doubt, however, that many of its clients could never expect to gain access to 
conventional formal financial institutions and that they prefer BancoSol over traditional sources of 
informal credit. BancoSol can legitimately claim to have expanded the frontier of microfinance. 
BancoSol' s success in terms of outreach and sustainability can be attributed, among other 
things, to the strcmg concern of its leaders with the financial viability of the organization, including 
the adoption of cost-covering interest-rate policies and a firm commitment to enforcing loan 
repayment. Success can also be attributed to the development of a cost-effective lending technology 
that is appropriate for the target clientele, because it is based on the accumulation of information and 
experience about the organization's market niche and about its individual customers. The high value 
of the organization-client relationships that were cultivated was further enhanced by the clear 
intention of permanence that was signaled by formalization as a private commercial bank. 
In turn, success of the lending technology has resulted from a potent combination of incen-
tives to repay that have been embedded in long-term implicit contracts with the clients. These 
contracts can be implemented at low costs to the organization and also result in low transaction costs 
for the borrower. The possibility of obtaining improving terms and conditions with successive loans 
adds value to the organization-client relationships that are at the core of the bank's strategy. At least 
for the clients that continue purchasing its financial services, these terms and conditions are 
sufficient to compensate them for the added costs and risks of the joint liability required of the 
borrowers in each group. 
Rapid growth at BancoSol has been based upon some unusual initial conditions, represented 
by the stock of tangible and intangible assets accumulated during the PROD EM stage. These 
intangible assets included information capital in the form of a lending technology, knowledge of its 
market niche, and organization-client relationships as well as the experience of its human capital at 
all levels of the organization. It takes time to accumulate these assets. 
From the head start made possible by these initial conditions, BancoSol managed to grow 
rapidly, due to formalization into a regulated financial intermediary. Upgrading increased its 
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capacity to attract loanable funds and to manage its liabilities with greater flexibility. Indeed, further 
grov.th of PROD EM had been constrained by limits on the management of its liabilities that were 
removed with the creation of Banco Sol. 
Formalization, however, was not costless, introducing difficult second-generation adjust-
ments.37 The switch from donor funding to market-based liabilities significantly increased Banco-
Sol's average cost of funds. At the same time, the maturing ofthe portfolio and the emergence of 
non-loan assets reduced the average revenue earned on productive assets. BancoSol responded to 
the challenge of a substantial reduction in its operating margin with an impressive reduction in 
average operating expenses. The behavior of operating expenses resulted, in tum, from a number 
of either conflicting or complementary trends. 
Decreasing average operating expenses reflected improvements in portfolio efficiency, mea-
sured as portfolio outstanding per unit of economic operating cost. Average economic costs had 
been US$ 1. 72 in 1987 and had declined to US$ 0.63 by 1991, just before the transformation. This 
average cost further diminished to US$ 0.42 in 1994 (Table 6). This reduction is difficult to achieve 
ir. any microfinance organization. 
Increased portfolio efficiency, hov.ever, was the result oftwo opposing forces: decreasing 
transactions efficiency and increasing loan size. The cost of keeping a client's balance in the 
portfolio for a year increased from US$ 149 in 1992 to US$ 242 in 1994, in reflection of the 
Ricardian limits on the productivity-enhancing impact of growth. The cost per loan disbursed 
increased from US$ 49 to US$ 93 during the same period. The impact on costs was only partially 
compensated by some increase in average terms to maturity. 
Reductions in transactions efficiency reflected, in turn, a shift from intensive to extensive 
growth. While growth during the PRODEM period was mostly intensive, resulting from gains in 
productivity and from increasing capacity utilization, growth during the BancoSol period was mostly 
extensive, resulting from rapid additions to the branch network. Accelerated creation of new 
branches and the accompanying hiring of new loan officers halted growth of average productivity 
or even decreased it. Smaller branch portfolios made it harder to dilute the fixed costs from branch 
operations, while the number of transactions per loan officer stopped growing. Thus, while 
extensive growth made major increases in outreach possible, the Ricardian limits to growth tended 
to dampen efficiency and profitability growth. 
37 This discussion ignores the additional operational costs that result from the reporting require-
ments levied on regulated financial intermediaries by the Central Bank and the demands for 
additional formal administrative structures that result from application of the banking 
regulatory framework. It also ignores the constraints on portfolio composition (e.g., risk 
categories) and the associated costs (provisions for bad loans) that emerge from the norms 
enforced by the prudential supervisor. 
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Thus, it \\>as the increase in average balance outstanding that allowed BancoSol to reduce its 
average operating costs, despite reductions in transactions efficiency. Some of the increments in 
average loan size were policy-induced, with BancoSol encouraging its loan officers to grant larger 
loans to borrowers at all stages of the organization-client relationship, before later reversing this 
policy in response to increasing arrears. Most of the increments in loan size were due, however, to 
accumulating experience about the clientele and to increased demand from the clients themselves. 
These last two sources of increase in loan sizes are not in contradiction with the organization's 
outreach objectives and do not represent a drift from the original mission. 
In addition to the limits to growth that naturally emerge from the boundaries of the lending 
technology, during the process of accelerated expansion BancoSol had to face challenges resulting 
from tension between its original informal culture and the larger size and complexity of the or-
ganization. These tensions have been addressed through the complementary roles of the earlier 
visionaries and the new bankers. Banco Sol can boast of the human and professional quality of its 
executive staff. The challenges ahead will be difficult, but the quality of these managerial resources 
permits a positive outlook about the future of the organization. 
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Table 1. BancoSol: Indicators of Breadth of Outreach, 1987-1995.a 
PROD EM BANCOSOL 
For the 12-months ending 
as of date Dec 87 Dec 88 Dec 89 Dec 90 Dec 91 Dec92 Jun 93 Dec 93 Jun 94 Dec 94 Jun 95 
Portfolio outstandingb ('000) 69 359 693 1,855 3,245 4,577 7,804 13,962 23,288 29,645 30,200 
Number of loans outstandingb 557 3,094 5,288 II ,394 18,681 18,333 26,310 36,573 46,755 54,681 59,745 
Amount outstanding per loanh 124 116 131 163 174 250 297 382 498 542 505 
Amount disbursed ('000) 587 1,917 3,692 9,504 16,706 22,720 35,285 59,592 76,928 84,039 80,899 
Number of loans disbursed 3,758 9,486 15,245 34,093 52,626 55,571 78,370 105,238 127,922 143,037 140,864 
Amount disbursed per loan 156 202 242 279 317 409 450 566 601 588 574 
Months to maturityc 1.8 3.9 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.4 46 5.1 
Dollar-years outstanding per 
loand 18 38 45 54 62 82 100 133 182 207 214 
Number of new borrowers 1,737 1,816 3,539 8,984 10,475 II ,056 16,006 23,510 30,814 30,021 23,200 
Cumulative number of new 
borrowers 1,737 3,553 7,092 16,076 26,551 37,607 46,525 61,117 77,339 91,138 100,539 
a All currency figures are in US dollars, converted from bolivianos of constant purchasing power as of December 1995, at the exchange rate as of that date. 
b Average of the corresponding figures (monthly balances outstanding, or monthly numbers outstanding, or monthly balance outstanding per loan). 
c Estimated as the average amount outstanding divided by the amount disbursed for each period. 
d Calculated as the average amount outstanding per loan divided by the average term of the loan, measured in months, and divided by 12. 
Source: Computed by the authors from PRODEM and BancoSol records. 
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Table 2. BancoSol: Characteristics of Clients Surveyed, 1995.a 
Women 
Client is head of household 
Education level: 
No schooling 
Up to grades 1-3 
Up to grades 4-8 
Up to grades 9-12 
Beyond grade 12 
Number of additional persons residing with client: 
0-3 persons 
4-7 persons 
8-14 persons 
Number of additional household members who are employed: 
0-1 
2-4 
5 and above 
Principal occupation: 
Trade 
Production (industry and agriculture) 
Services 
Client has secondary occupation 
Products marketed when the client is a trader: 
Domestically-produced goods 
Foreign goods 
Own production 
Business is separate from household 
Type of accounting system used: 
Uses accountant 
Simple income and expense records 
No written records 
Clients are attracted because: 
Simpler guarantee requirements 
Can borrow more 
Can obtain group rather than individual loans 
Less red tape 
Interest rate is lower 
Timeliness of loan 
Proximity 
Tenns are longer 
Clients are generally satisfied with: 
General relationship 
Guarantee requirements 
Tenn to maturity 
Interest rate 
Loan size 
a All figures are in percentages. 
Source: OSU survey ofmicrofinance clients, 1995. 
78 
42 
8 
25 
33 
31 
3 
22 
69 
9 
19 
78 
3 
63 
20 
17 
56 
69 
36 
31 
44 
1 
37 
63 
65 
48 
39 
33 
28 
15 
13 
13 
91 
94 
69 
55 
54 
Table 3. BancoSol: Terms and Conditions ofTypical Loan Contracts, 1995. 
Dimensions of loan product Currency Bs Bs Bs US't US$ 
Weeks between repayments 1 2 4 '} 4 
Average amount of repayment (US$) 5 10 16 39 80 
Average amount outstanding (US$) 34 42 50 338 467 
Amount disbursed Median (US$) 62 72 82 619 825 
Average (US$) 82 93 103 1,031 1,340 
Length of term Median (months) 3 4 6 9 12 
Average (months) 4 5 6 8 17 
Minimum (months) 1 4 4 6 6 
Maximum (months) 7 7 12 12 36 
Interest rates Nominal monthly contractual rate 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.5 2.5 
Flat fees and commissions 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.0 1.0 
Nominal monthly effective rate 6.1 5.6 5.2 3.0 2.9 
Monthly inflation rate 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.4 0.4 
Real monthly effective rate•·b 4.9 4.4 4.0 2.5 2.5 
a Effective rates (internal rate of return) calculated using the median values of the amount disbursed and median length of term. 
b Real rates are computed as the difference between nominal rates and inflation rates divided by one plus the rate of inflation. 
Source: Computed by the authors from PRODEM and BancoSol records. 
Table 4. BancoSol: Subsidy Dependence Indicators, 1987-1995. 
PROD EM BANCOSOL 
For the 12-months ending 
as of date Dec 87 Dec 88 Dec 89 Dec90 Dec 91 Dec 92 Jun 93 Dec 93 Jun 94 Dec 94 Jun 95 
Total subsidy" ('000) 231 296 571 681 1,046 1,314 837 1,486 106 (77) 313 
Portfolio outstandinga.b ('000) 175 679 1,891 5,522 12,577 17,776 31,388 64,060 94,015 128,697 133,929 
Nominal portfolio yield(%) 15 38 32 40 46 42 52 43 44 40 41 
Interest revenue• ('000) 26 257 604 2,232 5,801 7,547 16,462 27,236 40,966 50,847 54,827 
sm· 898 115 94 30 18 17 5 5 0 (0) I 
Nominal subsidy-free yield(%) 147 82 62 53 54 50 55 45 44 39 41 
Rate of inflation(%) 8 22 17 18 15 10 8 9 8 9 11 
Real subsidy-free yield (%)d 129 49 39 29 35 36 44 33 33 28 27 
Subsidy• ('000) 137 152 254 259 327 366 225 382 26 (18) 71 
Number of loans outstandingr 557 2,810 5,288 11,394 18,681 18,333 26,310 36,573 46,755 54,681 59,745 
Portfolio outstanding•·r ('000) 69 359 693 1,855 3,035 4,577 7,804 13,962 23,288 29,645 30,200 
Number of loans disbursed 3,758 9,486 15,245 34,093 52,626 55,571 78,370 105,238 127,922 143,037 140,864 
Amount disbursed• ('000) 587 1,917 3,692 9,504 16,706 22,720 35,285 59,592 76,928 84,039 80,899 
Subsidy per loan-year 
outstanding• 246.84 54.24 48.10 22.72 17.50 19.99 8.54 10.44 0.56 -0.33 1.19 
Subsidy per dollar-year 
outstanding• 1.987 0.425 0.367 0.140 0.108 0.080 0.029 0.027 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
Subsidy per loan disbursed• 36.57 16.07 16.68 7.59 6.21 6.59 2.87 3.63 0.20 -0.13 0.51 
Subsidy per dollar disbursed• 0.234 0.080 0.069 0.027 0.020 0.016 0.006 0.006 0.000 -0.000 0.001 
a Figures in unadjusted bolivianos. 
b Average of end-of-period and beginning-of-period net portfolio balances for 1987-1992 and end-of-period, middle-of-period, and beginning-of-period 
balances for 1992-1995. 
c Computed according to Yaron is (1994) methodology, as modified by Benjamin (1994). 
d Real yields= (nominal yields- inflation rate) I (I +inflation rate). 
e Figures in December, 1995 US dollars. 
f Average ofthe corresponding figures (monthly number ofloans or of monthly balances outstanding). 
Source: Computed by the authors from PRODEM and BancoSol records. 
Table 5. BancoSol: Revenues, Expenses, and Returns. 1987-1995 (percentages). 
PROD EM BANCO SOL 
For the 12-months ending Dec 87 Dec 88 Dec 89 Dec90 Dec91 Dec92 Jun 93 Dec93 Jun 94 Dec 94 Jun 95 
as ofdate8 
Revenues/productive assets: 
Revenue from lending 8 27 24 31 34 34 41 34 32 29 30 
Revenue from other operations 5 10 2 1 1 4 3 2 2 3 3 
Grants and extraordinary revenues 58 31 12 8 4 0 (0) 0 0 0 0 
Total revenue 71 67 38 40 40 39 44 36 34 32 33 
Expenses/productive assets: 
Personnel 30 24 14 11 13 18 18 I2 11 IO II 
Administration I3 II 6 9 8 8 7 5 4 4 4 
Depreciation 4 2 I I I 0 I 1 I I 1 
Taxes and other expenses 3 I 2 1 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 
Loan-loss provision and write-off 0 1 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 2 1 
Total operating expenses 49 39 23 23 27 31 30 21 18 18 I9 
Interest (cost of funds) 5 7 5 5 4 6 10 13 13 I2 12 
Inflation adjustments 10 6 14 9 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exceptional expenses 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 0 0 0 
Total expenses 64 52 43 37 37 36 41 35 31 30 31 
Retained earnings: current period 7 IS (5) 4 3 2 2 0 2 2 2 
Return on assets 5.6 12.3 (4.1) 3.4 3.0 2.0 20 0.3 2.0 1.9 1.8 
Return on equity 22.5 44.6 (18.1) 12.3 9.7 4.1 4.9 1.4 11.8 13.8 12.0 
Return on assets without grants (39.7) (13.1) (14.3) (4.0) (0.9) 2.0 3.4 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.8 
Source: Computed by the authors from PROD EM and BancoSol records. 
Table 6. BancoSol: Indicators of Efficiency 1987-1995. 
PROD EM BANCOSOL 
For the 12-months ending as of date Dec 87 Dec 88 Dec 89 Dec90 Dec 91 Dec 92 Jun 93 Dec 93 Jun 94 Dec94 Jun 95 
Accounting operational expenses• ('000) 93 192 257 629 1,415 1,880 3,360 4,640 5,895 7,365 8,012 
Accounting financial expenses ('000) 27 67 221 373 511 357 1 '101 2,725 4,194 5,029 4,903 
Accounting total expenses ('000) 120 259 478 1,002 1,926 2,236 4,461 7,365 10,088 12,394 12,915 
Operating grants not registered ('000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 17 8 
Economic operational costs ('000) 93 192 257 629 1,415 1,880 3,360 4,640 5,903 7,382 8,020 
Financial subsidiesb ('000) 43 73 69 138 271 503 627 764 860 840 863 
Economic total cost ('000) 163 332 547 1,140 2,197 2,739 5,089 8,129 10,958 13,250 13,787 
Economic operational costs per: 
Number of loans outstanding 166 62 49 55 76 103 128 127 126 135 134 
Portfolio outstanding 1.34 0.54 0.37 0.34 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.33 0 25 0.25 0.27 
Number of loans disbursed 25 20 17 18 27 34 43 44 46 52 57 
Amount disbursed 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Economic total costs per: 
Number of loans outstanding 292 107 103 100 118 149 193 222 234 242 231 
Portfolio outstanding 2.35 0.93 0.79 0.61 0.68 0.60 0.65 0.58 0 47 0.45 0.46 
Number of loans disbursed 43 35 36 33 42 49 65 77 86 93 98 
Amount disbursed 0.28 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17 
Product/economic operational cost:c 
Number of loans outstanding 0.60 1.61 2.06 1.81 1.32 0.98 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.74 
Portfolio outstanding 75 187 270 295 229 244 232 301 394 402 377 
Number of loans disbursed 406 494 594 542 372 296 233 227 217 194 176 
Amount disbursed 633 998 1438 1512 1181 1209 1050 1284 1303 1138 1009 
Product/economic total cost:c 
Number of loans outstanding 0.34 0.93 0.97 0.92 0.80 0.67 0.52 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.43 
Portfolio outstanding 43 108 127 150 140 167 154 172 213 224 219 
Loans disbursed 231 285 279 275 226 203 155 129 117 108 102 
Amount disbursed 361 577 675 767 718 829 697 733 703 634 587 
.. 
a All currency figures are m US dollars, converted from bohvmnos of constant purchasmg power as of December 1995, at the exchange rate as of that date. 
b As per computation of the subsidy dependence index. 
c Product (either number or total amount of1oans) per US$ 100 of the con·esponding category of expenses. 
Source: Computed by the authors from PRODEM and BancoSol records. 
Table 7. BancoSol: Indicators ofProductivity, 1987-1995.a,h 
PROD EM BANCOSOL 
For the 12-months ending as of date Dec 87 Dec 88 Dec 89 Dec90 Dec91 Dec92 Jun 93 Dec 93 Jun 94 Dec94 Jun 95 
Number of loan officers 6 10 20 31 54 59 86 116 133 159 183 
Number of total employees 13 19 35 60 97 96 136 184 213 260 302 
Number of branchesc 1 1 2 3 4 5 9 13 20 25 29 
Loan officers/employees 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Employees/branch 13.2 19.3 17.5 21.0 27.1 18.9 16.0 13.7 10.9 10.5 10.4 
Loan officers/branch 6.4 10.0 9.9 11.0 15.0 11.6 10.1 8.6 6.8 6.4 6.3 
Number of loans outstanding/loan 
officer 87 309 267 367 346 312 307 316 351 344 326 
Portfolio/loan officer ('000) 11 36 35 60 60 78 91 121 175 187 165 
Number of loans disbursed/loan officer 591 949 769 1,097 976 946 915 909 960 901 768 
Amount disbursed/loan officer ('000) 92 192 186 306 310 387 412 514 577 529 441 
Number ofloans outstanding/employee 42 160 151 191 192 191 194 199 219 210 198 
Portfolio/employee ('000) 5 19 20 31 33 48 57 76 109 114 100 
Number of loans disbursed/employee 285 491 437 572 542 579 577 573 600 549 467 
Amount disbursed/employee ('000) 45 99 106 160 172 237 260 325 361 323 268 
Number of loans outstanding/branch 557 3,094 2,644 4,022 5,213 3,606 3,095 2,726 2,387 2,202 2,066 
Portfolio/branch ('000) 69 359 347 655 906 900 918 1,041 1,189 1,194 1,044 
Number of loans disbursed/branch 3,758 9,486 7,623 12,033 14,686 10,932 9,220 7,844 6,532 5,760 4,871 
Amount disbursed/branch ('000) 587 1,917 1,846 3,354 4,662 4,470 4,151 4,442 3,928 3,384 2,798 
a All currency figures are in US dollars, converted from bolivianos of constant purchasing power as of December 1995, at the exchange rate as of that date. 
b Averages of monthly figures. 
Source: Computed by the authors from PRODEM and BancoSol records. 
Table 8. 
Repetition 
l 
2 
,., 
.) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
·') 
10 
11-23 
Total 
40 
BancoSol: Loan Size, by Repetition and Year when Loan was Granted, 1987-
1995.a 
Statistic 1987 1988 1989 !990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Mean 58 271 61 109 96 13 1 171 170 108 
Median 58 271 46 79 90 104 125 117 107 
Mean 146 13 l 116 204 231 222 297 272 199 
Median 146 143 124 176 178 189 213 236 203 
Mean 177 187 187 332 336 328 371 437 372 
Median !77 187 206 270 257 ..,..,,.., .).)/ 377 365 321 
Mean 260 199 184 382 421 550 -~ ' :).) -t 658 488 
Median 260 207 184 260 361 555 496 484 357 
Mean 293 185 293 603 608 779 679 697 
Median 286 185 298 436 292 654 487 433 
Mean 298 256 387 564 834 910 735 653 
Median 298 257 387 558 693 770 T'" ~.) 438 
Mean 330 327 112 604 1128 802 775 592 
Median 330 298 112 454 849 398 469 617 
M~an 272 350 755 745 931 882 1135 
Median 321 350 755 671 528 502 369 
Mean 364 318 346 829 1275 773 998 
Median 364 360 346 707 1020 713 454 
Mean 374 355 832 1373 1147 701 
Median 438 355 951 635 812 428 
Mean 341 438 731 1724 953 935 
Median 345 481 638 998 637 464 
Mean 129 225 208 262 392 547 582 486 460 
Median 119 2!5 206 245 3!9 351 301 302 260 
n 7 16 11 48 73 118 233 383 433 
Total 
142 
108 
241 
204 
379 
321 
534 
413 
657 
457 
691 
544 
721 
555 
871 
502 
879 
562 
954 
468 
1010 
598 
477 
286 
1333 
a All currency figures from bolivianos of constant December, 1995 purchasing power, converted 
to US dollars at the exchange rate ofthat date. 
n: number of observations. 
Source: OSU microfinance client survey, 1995. 

